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This article describes the features of the international mercury
market during the first half of the twentieth century. It analyzes
the various market agreements made, their effectiveness, and
their consequences. The period studied is little understood,
although it was one in which mercury production greatly in-
creased. It was also one that saw persistent efforts at market
manipulation, owing to a series of agreements between
Spanish and Italian producers that proved very effective until
the arrival of shipments of mercury produced by Soviet bloc
members and by some developing countries.
The story of mercury presents an important case in the history ofinternational market regulations. This article offers an approach to
a little-understood period in the production of mercury in which
market manipulation caused great increases in the production of the
chemical element. The period coincides with the end of Rothschild
control of Spanish mercury exports in 1921, the beginning of the exclu-
sive control of sales by the board of the Almadén and Arrayanes
mines, and the acquisition of the former Austro-Hungarian mines by
the second-largest world producer, the Italian Monte Amiata. These
changes led to a series of government-backed agreements between
the Spanish and the Italian producers and finally to the formation of
the worldwide cartel Mercurio Europeo (ME), based in Lausanne, in
1928. The Almadén and the Italian mines (Monte Amiata, Siele, and
Idria) fixed production quotas and ran a common policy on prices that
was only partly successful, as the asymmetric technological and commer-
cial capacities of the partners frequently permitted outsiders and
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marginal mines, especially in North America, to have a say in the world
market.1 Yet it is difficult to find a clearer example of a successful price
and quota cartel over such a long term (except, perhaps, the international
aluminum cartel), especially when one considers the number of outsiders
and the complexity of the commercial structure at the international level.2
Also noteworthy is the origin of the cartel, as it was promoted and
managed by two public concerns.3 The Spanish government had a
wealth of experience in mining (dating back to the sixteenth century
with the statemine inAlmadén), but it wasn’t until 1921 that the Treasury
took control of all industrial and commercial processes, almost a century
after transferring their sales to intermediaries. The story was similar but
much shorter in Italy: set up in 1897 by German investors, Monte Amiata
was controlled by a state holding, Istituto per laRicostruzione Industriale
(IRI), starting in 1933, five years after the cartel was established.
There are several studies on cartels inmining commodities. We have
excellent studies on bromine, chrome, tin, and aluminum, while the
works on bauxite, diamonds, uranium, and copper appear more
dated.4 One PhD thesis on the mercury cartel, some ten years after its
1On mercury market history, see Victoriano Martín, Los Rothschild y las minas de
Almadén (Madrid, 1980); Jeffrey MacKie-Mason and Robert Pindyck, “Cartel Theory and
Cartel Experience in International Minerals Markets,” in Energy: Markets and Regulation,
ed. Richard Gordon, Henry Jacoby, and Martin Zimmerman (Cambridge, 1987), 187–214;
Luciano Segreto, Monte Amiata: Il Mercurio italiano. Strategie internazionali e vincoli
extraeconomici (Milan, 1991); and Miguel López-Morell, “La comercialización del Mercurio
de Almadén durante el Siglo XIX y el primer tercio del S. XIX,” Boletín Geológico y Minero
119 (2008): 309–30.
2 For general literature on cartels in business history, see Akira Kudo and Terushi Hara,
eds., International Cartels in Business History (Tokyo, 1992); Dominique Barjot, ed., Interna-
tional Cartels Revisited, 1880–1980 (Caen, France, 1994); Geoffrey Jones, ed., Coalitions and
Collaboration in International Business (Cheltenham, 1993); and Margaret Levenstein and
Valerie Suslow, “What Determines Cartel Success?” Journal of Economic Literature 54
(2006): 43–95.
3Marian Radetzki, “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the International Metal
Mining Industry,” Resources Policy 15 (1985): 45–57.
4Margaret Levenstein, “Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre–
World War I Bromine Industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics 45, no. 2 (1997): 117–37;
Ian Phimister, “The Chrome Trust: The Creation of an International Cartel, 1908–38,” Busi-
ness History 38 (1996): 77–89; John Hillman, The International Tin Cartel (New York,
2010); Espen Storli, “Cartel Theory and Cartel Practice: The Case of the International Alumi-
num Cartels, 1901–1940,” Business History Review 88 (Autumn 2014): 445–67; Marco Ber-
tilorenzi, “Big Business, Inter-firm Cooperation and National Governments: The International
Aluminum Cartel, 1886–1939,” in Organizing Global Technology Flows: Institutions, Actors,
Processes, ed. Pierre-Yves Donzé and Shigehiro Nishimura (London, 2013); Steven
K. Holloway, The Aluminum Multinationals and the Bauxite Cartel (New York, 1988);
Debora Spar, The Cooperative Edge: The Internal Politics of International Cartels (Ithaca,
1994); Orris Herfindahl, Copper, Cost, and Prices, 1870–1957 (Baltimore, 1959); William
Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-ferrous Metals (New York, 1937); Ervin
Hexner, International Cartels (London, 1946); Great Britain Board of Trade, Survey of Inter-
national Cartels and Internal Cartels, 1944–1946 (London, 1976).
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beginning, is very informative.5 However, while some scholars based
their studies on extensive archival research, many others used indirect
sources. Our research employed primary sources that give an unprece-
dented inside view of the cartel management: minutes of ME, housed
at the archives of the Fundación Almadén; documents on the Almadén
mine, held by the Archivo Historico Nacional in Madrid; and materials
from the Monte Amiata Archives (at the Mining Museum in Abbadia
S. Salvatore), the Historical Archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry,
the IRI Historical Archives, and the Finmeccanica Archives, all in
Rome, as well as the Rothschild Archives in London and the National Ar-
chives of the United States.
The main aim of this study is to describe the features of the interna-
tional mercury market during the first half of the twentieth century. A
second objective is to analyze the various market agreements that
ensued, their effectiveness, the construction of distribution networks,
and the influence on othermercurymines. Next, we address the rationale
for setting up a cartel in a period when these were considered by many
economists, the League of Nations, the International Chamber of Com-
merce, andmost governments to be one of themost efficient tools for sta-
bilizing the international economy in turbulent times.6 Some authors,
like Jeffrey MacKie-Mason and Robert Pindyck, underline that in the
case of ME the efficiency of the cartel was largely undercut by external
factors.7 Our sources indicate otherwise, as suggested, for instance, by
Valerie Y. Suslow andMargaret Levenstein, who show that cartels are ef-
ficient when they adapt to the context in which they are supposed to
work, the potential benefits of which we will discuss. Other questions
of more general value also arise. Has this capacity to adapt to varying na-
tional and international conditions anything to do with the longevity and
relative stability of the cartel?
Under these conditions, as we demonstrate, themain objective of the
cartel, contrary to conventional wisdom, was not to define price policy
but to drive the market supply, in an attempt to establish the best
5RichardHess, “‘Mercurio Europeo’: Das internationale Quecksilber Kartell und die natür-
lichen und ökonomischen Voraussetzungen für die monopolistischen Stellung des Quecksilb-
ers auf dem Weltmarkt” (PhD diss., faculty of law, Zurich University, 1940).
6 Barbara Curli, “L’Italia, la Società delle Nazioni e la discussione sugli accordi industriali
internazionali, 1927–31,”Rivista di Storia Economica 1 (1990): 21–46; Terushi Hara, “La con-
férence économique internationale de 1927 et ses effets sur la formation des cartels internatio-
naux,” in International Cartels Revisited (1880–1980), ed. Dominique Barjot (Caen, 1994),
265–72; Eric Bussière, “La SDN, les cartels et l’organisation économique de l’Europe entre
les deux guerres,” in International Cartels, ed. Barjot, 273–83;Marco Bertilorenzi, “The Inter-
national Industrial Cartels Committee: The League of Nations, the International Chamber of
Commerce, and the Governance of International Cartels (1920s–1940s),” paper presented at
EBHA conference, Paris, 2012.
7MacKie-Mason and Pindyck, “Cartel Theory and Cartel Experience,” 201.
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conditions for the main actors to avoid overproduction and to continue
production for social reasons, since the Spanish and the Italian mines
were located in areas of few economic alternatives. The specific nature
of this study offers important arguments for considering the role of po-
litical institutions in cartelization and decartelization policy. In other
studies, states acted as external supporters or mere supervisors;
however, we show that the Italian and Spanish governments were very
active during the establishment of the mercury cartel and its evolution,
while Germany (during World War II) and, especially, the United
States (after 1945) were key figures in shaping mercury demand and in
questioning the very existence of the cartel.
Global Production of Mercury
Since ancient times, mercury has been used in paint (vermilion),
cosmetics, and medicine. In the mid-sixteenth century it became associ-
ated with the silver mining process in Peru and Mexico. Demand grew
with the discovery that mercury could also be used in industry for gold
plating, the production of physical instruments, paints, and mirrors,
and turbine manufacture.
A feature of the mercury market was its scarce supply: cinnabar
(from which mercury is extracted) is rarely found in nature, with few
mines on the planet. The largest and oldest deposits are in Almadén,
in the province of Ciudad Real, Spain. The Spanish Crown, the exclusive
owner of the mines from 1523, introduced standardization and all
dealers since have adopted the Spanish measurement of production,
based on the traditional 34.507-kilogram flask of mercury.8 The only
competition to Almadén on the worldmarket for the next three centuries
came from the Idria mines, located in present-day Slovenia. However,
since these mines were under the sovereignty of the Austrian monarchs,
agreements were easily made for the exclusive sale of surpluses to the
Spanish Crown.
This dynamic—an effective duopoly reinforced by the Rothschild
family, who controlled Almadén sales from 1830—ended in 1847 with
the discovery of the New Almaden seam, followed by other discoveries
in California, including New Idria (1854), Redington (1861), and
Sulphur Bank (1873). For well over a decade, the United States out-
stripped Spain as the leading world producer, and even though most of
8Although the mercury figures are universal, there is a slight deviation with North Amer-
ican production, where flasks are marginally smaller. Specifically, U.S. flasks weighed 76
pounds while Spanish ones were 34.5 kilograms, equivalent to 76.0582 pounds (75 Spanish
pounds).
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its production was for domestic consumption, the existence of the Cali-
fornian mercury led to a drop in international prices (see Figure 1).
Italy appeared prominently on the international stage in the twenti-
eth century. Production conditions in Italy differed vastly from those in
other countries. In Spain, for example, technological requirements were
lower, and until the 1920s (and even later) the Almadén mine was run
without any formal business accountancy; central administration pro-
vided financial support as needed. In Italy, though, mercury at the
surface was rare. Deposits were some nine hundred meters below the
surface, and mining the metal required highly modern and efficient
methods. The largest Italian company, Monte Amiata—set up in 1897
by German investors who introduced the best available technologies
for both mining and the industrial process—was very profitable.
Italian and Spanish producers were formal competitors, but since
their markets were geographically separate, they coexisted for a long
time without much interference in each other’s main markets. (Italy
sold through big German traders—Metallgesellschaft, Beer Sondheimer,
and Aron Hirsch—exporting mainly to Germany, Switzerland, and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.) Between 1905 and 1907, Monte Amiata
first proposed a cartel. The idea was rejected by the Rothschilds, who
agreed only to halt the price decrease started in 1901. Contact between
Figure 1. Accumulated production by countries of mercury in flasks, 1900–1960 (prices
$/ton). (Source: C. J. Schmitz, World Non-Ferrous Metal Production and Prices, 1700–
1976 [London, 1979], 130–31, 284–85.)
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the two big producers duringWorldWar I, when the ownership structure
of Monte Amiata was overhauled, had a different outcome. The German
shareholders (among them Kaiser Wilhelm II) sold their shares to a
Swiss banking pool, which later sold them to Banca Commerciale Ital-
iana, the biggest Italian bank. An agreement supervised by the British
government led to an entente between the Rothschilds and the
Spanish and Italian governments, with the former selling their
mercury in London during the war at a ratio of one Italian flask per
two Spanish flasks. The agreement led to a steep rise in prices, from
£7 per flask in 1914 to £24 in 1918, while for the same period in
New York the price rose from $48.31 to $123.47.9
In 1921, the Spanish government did not renew its agreement with
the Rothschilds but rather organized sales directly through the board
of the Almadén and Arrayanes mines. After the war, the Kingdom of
Italy annexed a small part of the Austro-Hungarian territory, including
the Idria mines, which passed directly into state control. The Italian gov-
ernment tried unsuccessfully to reach an agreement for joint control of
the international market, and it also failed to make a direct agreement
with the Rothschilds in 1920, when prices started to plummet (despite
a reduction in world production to just 75,500 flasks), due mainly to
Italy’s putting its mercury on the market below official prices.10
Some months later, the director of Monte Amiata, Riccardo Salva-
dori, appointed by the Banca Commerciale, went to Madrid with a pro-
posal to share out the market at an annual ratio of 60,000 flasks for
Italy and 40,000 for Spain. Despite Spanish production’s clear weak-
ness, no agreement was forthcoming. Almadén continued with its
system of sales until 1925, when it decided to sell almost its entire
output by open auction.11 The usual intermediaries, the Rothschilds
and Pickering, did not attend, and the winner was the Sociedad Española
del Mercurio, created for the purpose by the Banco Español de Crédito
and comprising Lazard Frères and other French banks.12 The agree-
ments with the Sociedad Española del Mercurio—which purchased
45,000 flasks at £14 in 1926 and 50,000 flasks at £17 in 1927—proved
highly profitable for the Spanish Treasury. This inflow of money (some
9Segreto,Monte Amiata, 58–62, 47, 221; López-Morell, “La comercialización delMercurio
de Almadén,” 325.
10 Julio Zarraluqui, Los Almadénes de azogue (Madrid, 1934), 748–49; Report of the
meeting of 19 Apr. 1920, and N. M. Rothschild & Sons to Alfredo Bauer (Madrid), 15 July
1921, both at XI-111-151, Rothschild Archives, London.
11Meeting of 30 Aug. 1941, R-15/527, Mercurio Europeo (hereafter, ME), Grupo Español,
vol. 6, Fundación Almadén Archives, Almadén (hereafter, AFA).
12 J. L. García Ruiz, “El Banco Español de Crédito, 1902–2002: Un siglo de servicio a la
economía Española” (unpublished document, 2002). The Banca Commerciale Italiana, the
main shareholder in Monte Amiata, would take a share. See Segreto, Monte Amiata, 86.
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44.7million pesetas)meant the Spanishmines could begin a very limited
modernization.13
The Establishment of the Mercury Cartel
The Italians continued in their attempts to convince Spain of the
need for an agreement, especially when there was a spectacular increase
in Almadén production, which jumped from 26,220 to 75,000 flasks
between 1921 and 1927, while sales soared from 19,507 flasks in 1921
to 61,885 in 1926.14
The Spaniards, meanwhile, were impressed by the technology and
commercial organization ofMonte Amiata. Production costs were partic-
ularly high for Almadén, though, as they were forced to recognize during
a visit to Italy in 1921. Despite a mineral concentration ten times higher,
production costs in Spain were only a fraction lower than in Italy.15
The belief that prices would remain high (around £21 to £22 per
flask in London in 1927–28, and between $117 and $123 in New York)
convinced the Spaniards to shy away from any agreement. But the
market trend did not confirm their assessment. After 1925, both the Ital-
ians and Almadén sold far fewer flasks, because the biggest mercury con-
sumers were betting on a price reduction, influenced by rumors spread
by traders. Despite the critical situation, their production strategies
were different: Monte Amiata decided to reduce production, the
Spanish mines to increase it. In the first quarter of 1928, Almadén,
pushed by the Italians and in turn pressured by the Spanish government
to step up the pace to reach a general agreement, produced almost the
same number of flasks as in all of 1927.
The forthcoming expiry of the agreement between Almadén and the
Sociedad Española delMercurio, plus the end of the agreements between
the latter and Monte Amiata, were decisive in opening the negotiations.
The more rational and entrepreneurial approach to the international
market shown by the Italian producers gained support during talks
that started in early 1928 in Madrid. Almadén stocks reached 50,000
flasks, while the Italian producers amassed 24,800. However, the real
risk was that the producers would be unable sell at all in 1930 because
traders had such a large number of flasks, bought at £4 to £5 lower
13 Javier Puigarnau, “Las minas de Almadén,” in Revista nacional de Economia (1925).
14 Zarraluqui, Los Almadénes de azogue, 800. According to some sources, Spanish mines
sold only 46,000 flasks in 1926.
15 “Visita a las minas de azogue de Italia,” 12 Nov. 1921, b. 2 file 2752, Sociedad Minas
Almadén, Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid (hereafter, SMA, AHN); documents dated 12
Mar. 1922 and 3 Feb. 1923, Serie Rossa, 520, Archivio Storico IRI, Archivio centrale dello
Stato, Rome (hereafter, ASIRI, ACS).
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than the average price over the previous two years. This new situation
meant that the leading producers would have to harmonize production
and control prices to set the market right.16
For the agreement to be valid only for flasks sold on the international
market (the domestic markets of both groups were excluded from the
entente), a single body was set up for sales of the mercury produced by
the associated mines. The day after the provisional agreement, both
groups started to sell as much of their stocks as possible at any price, par-
ticularly to Lazard Frères, which purchased over 88,000 flasks. In total,
big traders accounted for at least 100,000 flasks, a year’s worth of con-
sumption. This ambiguous, even counterproductive, choice condemned
the cartel to a difficult start. In fact, the agreement established that the
production level of each mine be linked to the number of flasks sold in
the previous five years. The cartel was to begin its activities by reinforcing
its main aim, which was to eliminate overproduction, as the only way to
prevent a crisis that could be lethal for any member.
The agreement that createdMEwas ratified inMadrid on September
9, 1928. It was to commence onOctober 1, 1928 and, for greater effective-
ness, both groups were bound not to make any sales with deliveries
scheduled after that day.17
The agreement established the level of production and sale at a rate
of 55 percent for Spain and 45 percent for Italy during the first three
years.18 In the following three years—and a further four, if the agreement
was extended—the figure would be 40 percent for Italy and 60 percent
for Spain. The sales price would be determined by the committee,
which could adjust it according to market circumstances or for other jus-
tified reasons.
The first meeting ofME’smanaging committee, chaired by Salvadori
and held on September 26, 1928, at the Bank of Spain’s office in Paris,
faced a challenge. The cartel could fight against the traders, who were
selling their flasks at 5 percent less than ME, but this condition might
last for at least eight or nine months (the time necessary for traders to
sell all their flasks), at the risk of worsening the economic and social
16Minutes of the Monte Amiata board of directors (hereafter, MA minutes), 14 Jan. 1928
and 3 Feb. 1928, General Legal Affairs Department, Archives Finmeccanica, Rome (hereafter,
AF). In 1974, Monte Amiata mining activities were concentrated in a new state-owned
company controlling all the mercury mines of the Amiata region. Finmeccanica, the Italian
state holding for the mechanical and defense sector, acquired its real estate and financial
assets, formally acquiring Monte Amita, when the company had already transferred its
mines to the state; “Venta del mercurio de las minas de Almadén,” 1 Feb. 1930, b. 2, file
3080, SMA, AHN.
17Meeting of 29 Sept. 1928, ME managing committee minutes, vol. 1, R-15/513, AFA.
18 The Italian share was distributed as follows: Monte Amiata 51.03 percent; Idria 25.67
percent; Siele 23.3 percent.
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situation in both Italy and Spain. The alternative was to find a compro-
mise in order to minimize sacrifices, which was Salvadori’s initial recom-
mendation. The committee chair proposed a price of £21.15 per flask,
with the idea of avoiding a conflict with traders while also taking into
account that mercury had been selling in London at over £22 for some
months. The committee fully backed his arguments, insisting on the im-
portance of promoting the image that the cartel had been set up not to
increase sale prices, but to regulate the market and avoid competition
between mines and the negative effects of speculation. However, the
cartel rejected Salvadori’s most important proposal for the U.S. market—
a price strategy based on dumping—which was supposed to block
smaller producers for whom the flask price of £21.15 was high enough to
keep them going.19
The authoritative tone of the ME directors continued during the
early months of the cartel, despite plummeting sales: 2,384 flasks in
October 1928 but just 226 in December. Even so, Salvadori’s report on
the first three months of the cartel set off no alarms. Indeed, he con-
firmed that all European production was in the hands of ME, other
than the tiny production of a few residual mines in Italy, which came
to some 2,000 flasks a year. Even the low (but growing) level of produc-
tion by the Italian outsiders was a danger for Monte Amiata, because the
Spanish partner could accuse the Italians of harming relations with
Almadén and so jeopardize the general agreement.20 In the following
years, no nation would be a competitive threat in Europe, and ME
would continue to supply 50 percent of world needs. There is no question
of ME’s leading role in the markets. North American production grew
because prices were high but it could not meet domestic demand. ME
assumed that in those three months and the following it would have to
pay for the excess production of the two previous years. This excess—
some 50,000 flasks, at a sales price of around £19—was in the hands
of British and German traders, sustained by Lazard Frères. For normal-
ity to return, this stock had to disappear.
Salvadori proposed two options: negotiate with Lazard Frères or
lower prices to £19 or less over a long period.21 He was in favor of main-
taining the approved price, as dropping the price to £19 would allow
traders to buy up stock and prolong their operations. He reckoned the
pressure from the traders would last until the end of March or beginning
19Meeting of 29 Sept. 1928, ME managing committee minutes, AFA; ME, “Considerazioni
sull’esercizio 1930,” 16 Jan. 1931, Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
20 Italian producers sold, in total, 61,200 flasks in 1928, 21,800 in 1929, and 23,000 in
1930, but the companies outside the consortium sold, in the same years, 1,000, 1,200, and
3,500 flasks, respectively. ME, “Considerazioni sull’esercizio 1930,” ASIRI, ACS.
21Meeting of 5 Feb. 1929, ME managing committee minutes, vol. 1, R-15/513, AFA.
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of April.22 His reckonings were overly optimistic. By May, the cartel had
sold just one-fifth of its projected amount. Meanwhile, stocks continued
to accumulate in the associated mines, until they stood at 63,420 flasks,
including three months’ reserve production. The total market stock was
around 83,000 flasks, with a growth rate that would take the number to
100,000 by the end of the year.
Faced with the possibility that the Lausanne office had mismanaged
sales, ME was forced to convert its main purchasers in each country into
commission agents, an option that appealed to them. The first four to
take up the new role, in the summer of 1929, were Mitsubishi, Leghorn
Trading Co., Roura & Forgas, and Hirsch & Sohn. From these the list
grew until it covered almost all the potential markets around the world.23
The representatives signed individual one-year contracts, all under
the same conditions, except the representative in England, Roura &
Forgas, which acted as a seller for ME but sold independently, while
the others were traders for the public. Representatives could sell no
mercury other than that produced by ME, and only at the price set by
ME, but they could create a stockpile and sell later at their convenience.
At the same time, ME was entitled to sell directly anywhere in the world,
but only at the same price as its representatives.
The situation did not improve and, with the exception of a few
months between the summer of 1929 and the spring of 1930, sales re-
mained very low. In the first twenty-seven months of ME’s life
(October 1928 to December 1930), world consumption totaled just
267,000 flasks, so the low level of sales was no surprise.24 Only the
good relations established over the years with the Spanish government
could limit the damage. In fact, the Italians recognized the coherent
conduct of their allies, who in 1930 resisted calls from Lazard Frères in
London offering £100 million to sustain the exchange rate of the
Spanish peseta on the international market in return for control of the
entire Almadén production.25 The mutual trust of the cartel’s
members, at least in this case, was not enough. Their mines overpro-
duced during troubled times. In late 1930 the ME directors recognized
that the problem was not one of stock or speculation but of a slump in
industrial demand brought about by a general crisis that was incompat-
ible with the cartel prices. In 1929 and in 1930, sales remained below
22There was a proposal for a reduction of 5 shillings to exceptional customers, on condition
that they did not make this public.
23Meeting of 7 Oct. 1929,MEmanaging committeeminutes, vol. 1, R-15/513, AFA;meeting
of 12 May 1931, ME managing committee minutes, vol. 2, R-15/514, AFA.
24ME, report on the year 1930, Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
25Riccardo Salvadori to J. Toeplitz, CEO of Banca Commerciale, 28 June 1930, Serie Rossa,
b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
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75,000 flasks, which was 50 percent of the 1928 level and, more impor-
tantly, 25 percent below average.26
In June 1931 ME exceeded for the second time its desired quota
of 7,500 flasks per month, although the figure fell again in the following
months. The cartel closed its third year with losses, never having reached
the 80,000 flasks per year it had envisaged. Financially, 1928–1929
and 1930 were better, with $4,089,935.85 and $3,487,214.90 in sales,
at a price of about $102 (£21) per flask; by contrast, Almadén had
sold its total 1927–1928 production at about $83 (£17) per flask to the
Sociedad Española del Mercurio. However, 1931 closed with just
$1,711,468.55 in sales, threatening the viability of the Italian and
Spanish mines alike.
InMay 1931, the Lausanne office was on the verge of collapse—an in-
direct symptom of the Italians’ and Spaniards’ mutual distrust. ME
decided on May 12 to reduce the price of a flask of mercury to £16 15 s.
as of June 1. The partners agreed that the office should have flexibility
regarding sales, with a minimum price set at £15. This decision was a
minimum requirement, considering that the sales performance of the
cartel was worse than the general negative trend of the world economy.27
Nevertheless, the production increase in the United States generated
some worries. High prices were encouraging marginal producers (the
number of mines rose from ten at the end of the 1920s to almost fifty
in early 1931) and provoked a slump in exports, despite significant, but
very exceptional, figures in 1931. U.S. antitrust law did not allow the in-
clusion of these companies in the cartel. Major consideration was given
to the idea of including the Mexican mines in ME; the tentative discus-
sions showed how difficult serious negotiation with them would be.
A Single Sales Agent
In October 1931, ME’s board addressed measures to stimulate sales,
such as giving wider margins to some intermediaries, like Roura &
Forgas, or significantly increasing their commissions. To make matters
worse, devaluation of the pound in September meant many customers
refused to trade in it. ME immediately reacted by shifting to the gold-
backed U.S. dollar as the currency in which to establish official
26Meeting of 20 Oct. 1930, ME managing committee minutes, vol. 1, R-15/513, AFA; ME,
report on year 1930, Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS. In particular, the large American market
fell spectacularly in 1930: only 1,200 flasks sold, compared to 11,356 in 1929.
27 “Mercurio Europeo, Considerazioni sull’esercizio 1931,” Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS;
“Sistema seguidos para la venta de las minas de Almadén desde la recission del contrato con la
casa Rothschild,” b. 2, file 2715, SMA, AHM.
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mercury prices, which nevertheless fell in the fourth quarter of 1931,
from $80 to $65 per flask.28
A new strategy was necessary. Spanishmines remained in the best po-
sition because of their structure, although offset by low international
opinion and the weakness of the Spanish government. Monte Amiata
and the Italian government had a better reputation, but business-
related costs limited freedom of movement. Meanwhile, the managers
of Monte Amiata, after toying with leaving the cartel, acknowledged in
1932 that they had overrated Spain: Spanish bureaucracy and government
were largely neutralizing the richness of the mines. However, their fears
about competing with Almadén in a freemarket did not completely disap-
pear. For Monte Amiata’s managers, negotiations had to start with the
main market traders, such as Pickering, Weis, Hirsch, Devisme, Beer
Sondheimer, and Offenbacher, the same people they had been fighting
for three years. For the Italians this was the last resort; the alternative
was dissolution of the cartel and all the risks that might entail.29
On behalf of the traders, Pickering offered a global contract that
aimed to sell 25,000 flasks a year for three years, at the current
market price (with a commission of 3 percent), with a margin of a
further 5,000 flasks against possible sales. ME would be able to sell
however much it wished but always at one pound more than the
traders, and not fewer than fifty flasks. Therefore, Pickering’s sales auto-
matically would be reduced by the same amount.30
Roura & Forgas immediately made a counterproposal. The Spanish
company offered to sell MEmercury everywhere in the world, other than
in Spain and Italy, from January 1, 1932, to September 30, 1934, under a
series of conditions. The firm was to sell a minimum of 30,000 flasks per
year (22,500 in the nine months of 1934), excluding sales for mercury
boilers, with a 3 percent commission. Roura & Forgas would aim to
sell 50 percent in the first half year, although the figure would be just
25 percent in 1932; the price was always to be fixed byME, but after con-
sultation, and with the possibility for Roura & Forgas to have 10 percent
elasticity to fight competitors.31 ME accepted the offer. The solution
implied the closure of ME’s costly and inefficient Lausanne office and
the chance of a worldwide distribution network for the new exclusive
seller.
28Meetings of October 1931, MEmanaging committee minutes, vol. 2, R-15/514, AFA;ME,
report on the year 1931, Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
29Meeting of 14 Dec. 1931, MA minutes, AF.
30Meeting of 17–18 Nov. 1931, MEmanaging committee minutes, vols. 2 and 3, R-15/514–
515, AFA.
31 Finally, as guaranteed, Roura & Forgas was to deposit $150,000 in a leading bank, agreed
upon withME, andwould allow the cartel to have a delegate in its offices to supervise the whole
process (meeting of 20 Nov. 1931, ME managing committee minutes, vol. 3, R-15/515, AFA).
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The choice of Roura & Forgas could not have been better under the
circumstances; sales rose immediately, although prices did not improve.
Indeed, not only did the firm cover the minimum quota for October 1932
but, more importantly, it put a stop to the growing sales of the outsiders
(see Figure 2), positioning the cartel as the world market leader again.
In January 1933, both parties agreed to modify the contract, after the
results of theprevious year, and the sales commitment increased to50,000
flasks at $30. If mercury sold at up to $32, Roura & Forgas would keep the
margin, while if the price reached $32 to $35, the margin would be split
with the cartel, on which Roura & Forgas was to receive a commission of
1 percent on total sales. Nevertheless, the market continued to depress
mercury prices, which fell to a low of $21.80 in August 1933. At that
price, Monte Amiata had to reduce its production and lay off most of its
workforce.32 Between the summer of 1933 and that of 1934, the Italian
company produced only 1,725 flasks, suffering major financial losses. In
Spain, the Almadén mine produced fewer than 20,000 flasks on average
between 1930 and 1934. Yet the cartel had saved itself.
Figure 2. Distribution of sales in the world mercury market, 1926–1935. (Source for 1927–
1931, except 1928: Report from Roura & Forgas, Mercurio Europeo, Comité Directive
minutes, vol. 3, Fundación Almadén Archives, Almadén; for 1932–1935: calculated from ME
sales and J. Zarraluqui Martínez, Los Almadenes de azogue [Minas de cinabrio]: La Historia
frente a la tradición [Madrid, 1934], 799).
Note: Before 1928, ME sales means the sales of the cartel member mines.
32 The Italian mercury mines went from employing 3,207 workers in 1929 to just 865 in
1934 (Segreto, Monte Amiata, 226).
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This apparent honeymoon among ME partners masked many prob-
lems. On the one hand, the American market was still weak, while U.S.
dollar instability permitted Mexican producers to compete with ME. On
the other hand, the U.S. mercury companies, now united in the National
Quicksilver Producers Association, admitted the possibility of an agree-
ment with ME based on fixing a minimum price for flasks. Nevertheless,
American companies made it clear that, without such an agreement,
they were ready to ask the Roosevelt administration for strong protection
against foreignmercury. The Almadén representative rejected the propos-
al on the basis that any price agreement with the American mines would
open the door to an even more aggressive policy by Mexican producers.33
After another visit to Almadén in 1933, Monte Amiata’s managers
deemed the situation an opportunity to break the agreement with their
partners and return to higher sales levels. They (naively) hoped to rene-
gotiate the cartel more favorably. Meanwhile, the ownership structure of
Monte Amiata had changed significantly. After the beginning of the
Depression, the banking system was overhauled, short- and long-term
credit were separated in 1931, and, more importantly, a state holding
company, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), was set up in
1933 that took over all shareholdings of the main Italian banks,
making IRI the new major shareholder of Monte Amiata. A new chair-
man was elected, Vincenzo Fagiuoli, a professor of ancient Greek and
Latin at the University of Turin before becoming the secretary to
Finance Minister Alberto De Stafani in the first Mussolini government.
Fagiuoli had had recent successes as manager of two state-controlled
companies, Società finanziaria per l’industria e il commercio and
Società egiziana fosfati (Finance Corporation for Industry and Com-
merce and the Egyptian Phosphate Company).
He was no less strong in defending Italian interests, but he had a
clear vision of the real balance of power between the two partners. In
1933, the Spanish group threatened to decrease the flask price in an
attempt to eliminate outsiders but also to attack the Italian mines. In
fact, Almadén’s strategic aim was to maintain the agreement but to rene-
gotiate the quota towards a 65:35 proportion, from the 60:40 division set
in 1931. The new Spanish Republican government—which defined the
Almadén mine as “very rich”—was against the renewal of the cartel, con-
vinced that Spain could get more without the Italian producers. The
general director of the mines was in favor of a new agreement, not
only because of his sympathies for Italy and its regime; he also declared
33 “Annexe au procès verbale de la réunion du Mercurio Europeo tenue à Paris les 9–14
octobre 1933,” Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
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at the end of the Italian-Spanish mercury deal that the agreement “could
be renewed with advantages for both parties.”34
According to the Italian ambassador in Spain, Almadén directors
had practical and technical interests for keeping the agreement,
mainly due to the “still not perfect and efficient preparation for a com-
petitive regime with Italy from both the metal extraction and the com-
mercial point of view.” However, he also criticized the former Monte
Amiata CEO, Salvadori, for being too optimistic in negotiations with
the Spanish partners. Salvadori started talks with the tactic of denounc-
ing the agreement, and the strategy of offering a small piece of the pie
to the Spaniards (to include some Italian outsiders in the cartel) to
keep the production proportions between the two groups (40 percent
for Italy and 60 percent for Spain).35 Fagiuoli was a better negotiator
than Salvadori, because he admitted that the modernization and the
technical capabilities of the Spanish mines left the Italians little to
hope for: “The Spanish will be able to deliver the mercury alone to
all the market, and if we Italians remain, for national prestige, on
the market and keep selling, we should incur losses and these will be
only for the state.”36
This more realistic position facilitated new talks between the two
groups. After lengthy negotiations, the cartel partners renewed the
agreement on June 7, 1934, for two years and included conditions that
Spain perceived as beneficial. The quotas of each country were to incor-
porate all the mines, including the outsiders, because the Italian state
had taken over the administration of the whole production; further,
chairmanship of ME was to be permanently in Spanish hands.37 Both
partners appeared satisfied with the new agreement. The Spanish
group still had to copewith high production costs, despite some technical
improvements. For Almadén, the prospect of a commercial war with the
Italians was highly unattractive, because the Italian government had far
more means with which to support the Amiata mines; the slow increase
of their quotas was some compensation for the Italian sales of byprod-
ucts (for instance, mercurial salts) outside the cartel, which reached
the equivalent of 4,000 to 5,000 flasks per year. For the Italian mines,
it was a success to keep the Spanish request for higher levels of the
34Document signed by Luigi Cardella, 14 Aug. 1933, Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS;
Report dated 9 Feb. 1934, b. 2 file 2715, SMA, AHM.
35 Italian ambassador Raffaele Guariglia to Italian Foreign Ministry, 26 Aug. 1933, Serie
Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
36 Vincenzo Fagiuoli to the Italian Ministry of Corporations, 7 Jan. 1933, Serie Rossa,
b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
37 Almadén would retain 60 to 66 percent and the Italian group 40 to 44 percent; MEman-
aging committee minutes, vol. 4, session 9, 11 Oct. 1934, R-15/516, AFA.
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quota and the implicit agreement among all the Italian mines under
control.38
At the end of 1933, after refusing Pickering’s proposal to replace
Roura & Forgas as an exclusive agent, with the prospect of selling
flasks on the promising Japanese market, ME signed a new contract
with Roura & Forgas valid until January 1936.39 It granted the
company leeway of 15 percent on the price set by ME, with minimum
sales of 115,000 flasks for the following twenty-three months. This
figure fell far short of the cartel’s final sales, which grew from 61,852
flasks in 1933 to 92,679 in 1935, when the Almadén mine had exhausted
its stock and the Spanish government began work to extend the mine.
The evolution of the cartel caused great satisfaction among the part-
ners during the League of Nations’ eight-month sanctions against Italy,
which followed the Italo-EthiopianWar in 1935. The Italians could contin-
ue to export to nonboycotting countries (i.e., Germany, Japan, Hungary,
and the United States), thanks to the agreement with their Spanish part-
ners. However, the Spanish mines’ production remained low, and their
stocks were lower than the Italians had feared. The myth that Spanish
minescouldguarantee theentireworldproductionwasfinallydebunked.40
By the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, in 1936, the Almadén mine
had recovered, with 43,000 flasks produced and sales continuing the suc-
cessful trend of the previous year. The mines remained under the control
of the Republican government for most of the war, which in turn consid-
ered them one of its safest financing assets (see Table 1). Relations with
Italy became complicated, with the fascist Italian government supporting
General Franco, even sending arms and troops to help him, while main-
taining contacts with the Spanish Republican government.41 As early as
November 1936, Italy recognized Franco’s nationalist government. One
month later Rome signed a provisional agreement with Franco (which
again gave the Italians a 45 percent quota plus the possibility of selling
outside the cartel), to be valid for one year from when Nationalist
troops occupied Almadén. To avoid any suspicion, and to limit any
attempt by theRepublican government to denounce the cartel, the Italians
agreed to continue the contract with Roura & Forgas. However, Monte
38 Siam and Argus mines accumulated over 4,000 flasks. “Nota acerca de la negociaciones
mantenidas con el grupo italiano sobre la posible renovacion del contrato en vigor con Italia
para la venta del azogue,” 9 Feb. 1934; documents dated 16 Sept. 1936; and “El primer contrato
entre los gobiernos espanol e italiano,” undated draft, all in b. 2 file 2715, SMA, AHN.
39ME managing committee minutes, vol. 4, 15 Jan. 1934, R-15/516, AFA; “Mercurio
Europeo, Rapporto sulle sedute del Comitato direttivo di ‘Mercurio Europeo,’ tenute a
Parigi dal 10 al 15 dicembre 1934,” Serie Rossa, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
40Document dated 3 Mar. 1936, n. 1, file 1240, SMA, AHN.
41 Vincenzo Giura, Tra politica ed economia: L’Italia e la guerra civile spagnola (Naples,
1993).
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Amiata’s real fearwas that once Franco took over Almadén he could sell all
the stock and pay off some of the huge international debt amassed in just a
few years by the Nationalist government.
The Republican government decided to continue its operations with
Roura & Forgas (but nowwith the discrete supervision of Fagiuoli) under
the same conditions as the cartel. On this occasion it delegated sales to
the London-based company Amalgamated Merchants Ltd., whose
general manager was Cesar Sanz, a naturalized British subject and
general director of Roura & Forgas. The Italians exploited the situation
to go beyond the quota established in the agreement. In the first nine
months of 1937, ME sold 61,021 flasks. The cartel had assigned a quota
of 33,562 flasks to Almadén and 27,459 to the Italians; in reality, the
Spaniards sold just 22,497 flasks and the Italians 38,614.42 The Musso-
lini government was also considering asking Franco, once he had taken
over Almadén, to give Italy total control of the Spanish mines’ commer-
cial activities as compensation for its financial support of the military
coup. This was not to be, but Fagiuoli renegotiated a better production
quota, 45 percent, for the Italian group.43 The imbalance continued in
1938, when the Italians sold 22,000 flasks at $66 each, while Almadén
sold only 10,000, and at just $52.44
Table 1




Siele Idria Argus Total
Italian Mines
Almadén
1935 14,860 3,900 8,017 4,300 31,147 35,600
1936 21,170 7,190 8,929 5,900 42,489 43,357
1937 36,200 17,742 8,206 4,700 66,828 28,353
1938 36,000 17,600 7,942 4,500 66,042 41,409
1939 30,500 20,000 10,800 4,500 65,800 41,409
Source: Luciano Segreto, Monte Amiata: Il Mercurio italiano. Strategie internazionali e
vincoli extraeconomici (Milan, 1991), 135, 218.
42Meeting of 22 Sept. 1937, MA minutes, AF.
43 Segreto, Monte Amiata, 129. With an international market price of $62 to $67, the
project was to give the Spanish $8 to $10 per flask, the balance to be given to the Italian Min-
istry of Finance. The Italian government estimated that this would bring 40 million lira into
Italy (meeting of 27 Feb. 1937, MA minutes, AF).
44Meeting of 19 Oct. 1938, MA minutes, General Legal Affairs Department, Added Ar-
chives, AF.
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The War Business
Almadén fell into Nationalist hands on March 27, 1939, just days
before the end of the Spanish Civil War. The ME agreement was
renewed on July 4, 1939, extending to April 1940, with revised quotas
that the Italians had requested during the first secret negotiations with
Franco, in 1938.45 Outsider mines were not included—a sign of
Spanish weakness.
Despite renewing its contract with Roura & Forgas in January 1939,
the Franco government broke with the company over its support of the
Republican government. It called for tenders in the fall of 1939;
however, a new contract was not awarded, since none of the bidders
were considered sufficiently knowledgeable about the business, nor
could any provide appropriate financial guarantees. The proposals of
Pickering and Roura & Forgas, who made an offer through the banker
Juan March, had been discarded beforehand.46
According to article 17 of the existing agreement, the outbreak of
World War II theoretically implied an automatic dissolution of the
cartel. However, neither of the partners had any interest in taking that
step. The Italians feared that the Spanish government would start
huge sales of flasks at very low prices; the Spaniards knew that their com-
mercial network was still too poor (the biggest market, Germany, was no
longer reachable, with Italy satisfying all its demand) and production
costs were too high. Moreover, a negotiation for the renewal of the
cartel after the war would have given the Italians the opportunity to
seek higher quotas.47 The main consequence was a spectacular increase
in both sales and prices. In the last weeks of September 1939, prices rose
from $80 to over $100 per flask, with two immediate agreements with
the British and French governments to provide them with 10,000 and
5,000 flasks, respectively. This sudden demand stimulated the cartel
into raising minimum prices to $120 and $125 for Europe and Asia at
the end of November, only to increase them by another $20 inDecember.
A fewmonths later the official price was $250, which held throughout the
war (see Table 2 and Figure 3).48
Following the failure of the sales auction, in early 1940 Spanish Trea-
sury Minister José Larraz was determined to regain direct management
of sales through two independent offices, one in Madrid and one in
Rome, even though the Almadén directors and the Italian partners
45Meeting of 18 July 1940, MA minutes, General Legal Affairs Department, Added Ar-
chives, AF; Meeting of 8 May 1939, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 5, R-15/526, AFA.
46Hess, “‘Mercurio Europeo,’” 130.
47 “Prórroga del convenio Hispano-Italiano,” June–Sept. 1940, b. 2 file 3126, SMA, AHN.
48Meetings of 5, 25, and 28 Nov. 1939, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 5, R-15/526, AFA.
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advised otherwise. The experiment was not a success; rather than coop-
erating, the offices often competed against each other. The upshot was
that by the end of the year Italy had so exceeded its quota, largely
through intense sales to Germany, that it asked to abandon the 55:45
quota agreement, because of the six-billion-lira Spanish debt to Italy.49
By then, however, the Spanish, Italian, and German governments
had decided that from mid-1941 the Frankfurt-based Metallgesellschaft
would handle the cartel’s sales, as indicated by the Reichstelle für Metal-
len, in charge of controlling metal consumption in Germany and all ter-
ritories under the Third Reich.50
The contract with the Metallgesellschaft shared many similarities
with that signed earlier with Roura & Forgas. The German company
was to sell the entire ME production, at the price stipulated by ME, in
Germany and in all the countries under its military control (i.e.,
Holland, Belgium, occupied France, Poland, Serbia, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, and Norway).51 Thereafter, Almadén sales were increasingly
concentrated in Germany.
Meanwhile, the agent for North America, Nussbaumer, informed the
cartel that the U.S. government would consider a possible purchase of
Table 2
Almadén Mercury Purchasers, 1943
Country Number of
Flasks
Paid (US$) % Sales Price US$
(Average)
Germany 33,638 (30,654) 6,727,600 66.15 200
Sweden 190 (999) 7,500 0.37 250
Ireland 60 (0) 15,000 0.12 250
Portugal 16,539 (38,616) 4,134,750 32.52 250
Belgian
Congo
8 (0) 2,000 0.02 250
Finland 419 (0) 104,750 0.82 250
Totals 50,854 (70,289) 11,031,600 100.00
Source: Mercurio Europeo Spanish group minutes, vol. 6, meetings of 1 Feb. 1943 and 3 Feb.
1944, R-15/527 Fundación Almadén Archives, Almadén.
Note: Sales in 1942 are in parentheses, including a sale of five flasks to Denmark by the cartel.
49Meeting of 13 May 1940, MA minutes, General Legal Affairs Department, Added Ar-
chives, AF.
50Meetings of 30 Aug. 1941 and 22 Jan. 1942, ME Spanish groupminutes, vol. 6, R-15/527,
AFA; meetings of 14–19 Dec. 1941 (meetings in Geneva, Zurich, Basel, and Frankfurt), ME
managing committee minutes, vol. 6, R-15/518, AFA. After the agreement was signed, meet-
ings were held in Berlin.
51 During the negotiations, the Reichstelle für Metallen tried to decide the price but was
opposed by the cartel.
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50,000 to 100,000 flasks from Almadén, on condition that the price
was around $200. This did not materialize once the United States
entered the war.52 From then on, exports to Japan, which had been
the largest buyer of Spanish mercury before the attack on Pearl
Harbor, became increasingly complicated, not so much for problems of
transport as for payments.53 Note the figures in Table 2 for exports to
Portugal, a country whose industry had no mercury needs. It seems
these shipments ended up in the hands of the Allies.
In short, the early years of WorldWar II marked the highpoint of the
cartel’s activity, but did not stem growing distrust among its members.
Almadén and the Italians enjoyed record sales in 1940 (98,199 flasks)
as well as record production in both 1941 and 1942 for Italy (94,230
and 94,161 flasks, respectively) and Spain (86,473 and 72,288 flasks).54
This did not mean that Spain sold below its quota in those years, since
in 1942 the Italian group compensated the Spaniards for the deficits of
Figure 3. Mercurio Europeo sales and gross earnings, 1929–1943. (Source:Mercurio Europeo,
managing committee and Spanish group minutes, 1928–1943, Fundación Almadén Archives,
Almadén.)
52Meeting of 30 Oct. 1941, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 6, R-15/527, AFA.
53 In August 1942 an offer from Japan to purchase 20,000 flasks had to be rejected because
half the payment was offered in gold, with no guarantee that it could be delivered (meeting of 4
Sept. 1942, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 6, R-15/527, AFA).
54 A good part of the increase in Spanish production figures was due to the use of forced labor
in the Almadén mines (Angel Hernández, Los esclavos del rey [Almadén, 2010], 364–70).
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the two previous years by increasing its stock. The Italians were keen to
keep good bilateral relations knowing that the cartel’s dissolution would
allow Almadén to sell to Germany at $70 to $80, when the Italians, with
Spain’s permission, were selling at $200 outside the cartel.55
In 1943, the Allies’military operations in Italy led to further difficul-
ties for the cartel; nevertheless, ME continued to function formally. The
last meeting of the cartel during the war was held in August 1943 in
Zurich. After that, the partners accessed less information about each
other’s dealings, and what did arrive came by letter or telegram, since
the Italians were unable to get visas to visit Switzerland. In 1943, the Ital-
ians declared sales of 19,797 flasks, although the Spaniards suspected
fraud, since they had evidence of sales of 42,800 flasks in total and
could hardly believe that the difference was due solely to domestic con-
sumption. As the months went by, Spain felt increasingly free not only to
impose its own price policies, but also to sell to Germany (where an of-
ficial representative agency was set up).56
The situation in Almadén became dire in 1944: only 343 flasks were
sold in the whole year. The messages sent to the Italians at the end of the
year all pointed toward the need for a reduction in the official price as
soon as possible.57 The Italians’ response was an emphatic no, since
they needed funds to restore the lamentable state of their mines, de-
stroyed by the retreating German troops.
The first days of 1945 saw a series of meetings held in Madrid
between U.S. embassy staff and the Almadén directors. These meetings
proved to be a turning point, both in the mercury export policy of the
Spanish government and in the structure of the world mercury market.
The Franco government admitted to having a stock of 89,754 unsold
mercury flasks at the end of 1944.58 From then on, sales to the United
States began to rise and, even before the war was over, it had become
the largest importer of Spanish mercury.
Destabilizing the Cartel
Peace brought a glut of flasks onto the biggest markets: 100,000
flasks in the United States and 30,000 in the U.K. The American stock-
piling strategy included massive purchases of mercury, which would
affect the market over the coming decade. The general slump in
55Meetingof 6Nov. 1941,MAminutes,GeneralLegalAffairsDepartment,AddedArchives,AF.
56Meetings of 12 May 1944 and 19 Oct. 1944, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 6, R-15/527,
AFA; b. 2, files 2763 and 3138, SMA, AHN. A special representative was also nominated for the
United States.
57Meeting of 1 Nov. 1944, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 6, R-15/527, AFA.
58Meeting of 12 Feb. 1945, ME Spanish group minutes, vol. 7, R-15/528, AFA.
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international prices had pushed the U.S. mines to the verge of collapse,
after the 1943–44 boom had transformed the country for the first time
into a mercury exporter. Most of the mines were by now incapable of op-
erating below $200 per flask, while the New York price was barely
holding at $100. Although domestic demand was high, U.S. consumers
wanted to buy at a lower price than the cartel was demanding.59
In August 1945, ME held its first formal meeting in two years. The
aim was to rebuild the cartel’s sales structure and generate a new sales
policy. The price of $100 was considered unrealistic, but $80 was not,
thereby marking an end to the war market. However, the U.S. adminis-
tration’s new approach to cartelization also influenced discussions. Con-
ceived during the war, it opposed all international cartels and any
restrictive business practices.60
In 1946 the cartel was renewed and the partners discussed finding a
new exclusive agent. For the Italian group, the Zurich-based Anglo-
Foreign Securities, later renamed Transalpina, offered the best condi-
tions (a three-year contract for 65,000 flasks per year, with a commission
of 4.5 percent up to 30,000, 5 percent to 40,000, and 5.5 percent there-
after). The Almadén directors were reluctant to accept an Italian firm as
sole seller, but finally agreed.61 However, Transalpina was not able to
raise the $600,000 deposit/guarantee required by the contract, so ME
was forced temporarily to revert to the old system of multiple, regional
representatives.62
A price agreement provedmore complicated. In a weak international
market (prices fell from $92 in 1946 to $76 in 1948), the two main part-
ners had opposing needs: the Spanish wanted low prices to raise con-
sumption, while the Italians wanted more stable or higher prices to
increase their balance-sheet liquidity. The Italians were also tricking
their Spanish partners by selling flasks to the Allied Commission, official-
ly through outsiders that technically no longer existed, despite the estab-
lishment in 1946 of special rules for these sales.63
In 1948, the cartel discussed establishing a central sales bureau in
Paris or in Zurich, but the Spaniards opposed this for domestic political
59Meeting of 26 Mar. 1946, MA board of directors minutes, AFA. The situation probably
also was influenced by the fact that the Allies found 45,000 to 50,000 flasks in Germany
when they occupied the country in 1945, but it is not known in what proportion the United
States and United Kingdom split this quantity of flasks.
60Wendy Asbeek and Richard Griffiths, “L’European Recovery Program e i cartelli,” Studi
storici 37, no. 1 (1996): 41–68; Luciano Segreto and Ben Wubs, “The Resistance of the Defeat-
ed: German and Italian Big Business and the American Anti-Trust Policy, 1945–57,” Enter-
prise and Society 15 (June 2014): 307–36.
61Meeting of 12 Oct. 1946, MA board of directors minutes, AFA.ME received other propos-
als from Pickering and Roura & Forgas.
62Meeting of 7–8 Dec. 1946, ME managing committee minutes, vol. 6, R-13/520, AFA.
63 Segreto, Monte Amiata, 152–54.
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reasons.64 However, ensuing events made any agreement between the
members of the cartel impossible. Despite doubts in the system of repre-
sentatives and low sales, the market held good opportunities for both
groups. In 1948, the cartel sold 113,583 flasks (the Spanish 85,117 and
the Italians 28,466). Prices were slowly returning to manageable levels
for both groups, while the Italians had accepted the idea of some compen-
sation for Almadén, such as the exclusive sale of 10,000 flasks to Imperial
Chemical in 1948. The U.S. government requested that the cartel sell
80,000 flasks at a maximum price of $75, but preferably at $70. The
cartel confirmed that it could immediately sell up to 100,000 flasks at
those prices. Negotiations continued during the spring of 1949.65
The American strategy became clearer in the comingmonths. On the
one hand, the U.S. government started separate, secret negotiations with
each group to buy 80,000 flasks outside the cartel; on the other hand, in
April 1949, after reaching an agreement with the Italians, it made efforts
to disclose the information in order to destabilize the cartel. Protests to
the committee of directors and to the highest levels of both governments
followed, at a time when other diplomatic discussions on the payment of
the Spanish debt to Italy and opportunities for Italian firms to enter the
Spanish market were in full swing. The Italian government claimed that
the sales had beenmade under theMarshall Plan rules, within the frame-
work of U.S. strategic stockpiling, which would not in any case affect the
market—an opinion Spain clearly did not share.66 Hypocrisy and mis-
trust were rife among the partners.
To complete the destabilization of ME, in 1952 the U.S. administra-
tion discreetly offered the Italian government information about 1950
Almadén sales that took place outside the cartel: 45,000 flasks under
the British-Spanish trade agreement, 40,000 to Global Trading Co. of
Lichtenstein (a company working for the Soviet government), and
7,000 to an American buyer.67 This information greatly reduced the
64U.S. commercial attaché in Bern to State Department, RG 59, 865.602/7-2388, Archives
II, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md. (hereafter, NARA).
65Meeting of 10 Feb. 1949, MA board of directors notes, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS; sessions of 28
May 1948 and 2–5 Apr. 1949, MEmanaging committee minutes, vols. 6 and 8, R-15/520, AFA.
66Meeting of 13 Sept. 1949, MA minutes, AFA; Note for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
6 Mar. 1952, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS; Ministero industria e commercio, Commissione central
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de Historia Contemporánea Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 2009). The U.S. decision
probably was linked to the perspective that the Italian government was ready to include
some deliveries of flasks to the Soviet Union in the framework of war reparations (Segreto,
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space for Spanish legal complaints, despite the Madrid government
having officially announced its intention to ask the Italians to pay $47
million under article 5 of the cartel agreement.68 Moreover, the U.S. ad-
ministration authorized the Pacific Foundry Co. to export new furnaces
to Spain—to increase Almadén production—to replace obsolete Busta-
mante furnaces. Real modernization was finally underway.69
Once it became clear that all these tactical moves were solely to
reframe the agreement under better conditions, the members of the
cartel started negotiations.70 These were completed by 1954, when a
secret agreement came into force, with a new, more formal one
planned for 1958.Meanwhile, the Italians had already agreed to compen-
sate the Spaniards for the 1949 sale to the U.S. stockpile, with 812million
lira or $1.3 million and the exclusive right to sell mercury to the United
States for twelve to eighteen months, up to a value of $8.3 million.71
However, the cartel and market conditions would now be vastly dif-
ferent, with new entries from the Soviet bloc, Africa, and Asia, where pro-
duction costs were lower than in Spain. The duopoly was over, even
though the cartel formally continued until 1972.
Conclusion
Mercurio Europeo provides an example of a cartel for a single
product with a tremendously varied internal organization over a relative-
ly long period and allows for reflection on the effectiveness of collusion
in a series of situations, not to mention the efficiency of publicly run
economic sectors.
The rationale behind the cartel was optimization of the mining pro-
ducers’ income in response to traditional international market interme-
diaries by avoiding competition among its members. The level of
concentration in the mercury industry contributed to the agreement, al-
though the cartel’s costs and production tipped in favor of Almadén. The
strategy of cheating or excluding the Italian mines, through sharp price
reductions, was in theory a card held by the Spaniards. Yet, in the long
term, both countries gained more by cooperating than they would have
if competing. In addition, the cartel worked, despite the instability of
the 1930s and 1940s. However, the cartel had internal problems
during its twenty-six most active years. Therefore, we do not support
68Note for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 Mar. 1952, b. 520, ASIRI, ACS.
69 “Mejora de las instalaciones metalúrgicas,” b. 2, file 1951, SMA, AHN.
70Meeting of 27 Jan. 1950, Spanish sales committee minutes, AFA.
71 Comité Exterior de ventas, vol. 2, 30 Aug. 1954, R-15/527, AFA. See also Segreto,Monte
Amiata, 164; MacKie-Mason and Pindyck, “Cartel Theory and Cartel Experience,” 193.
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the general findings of MacKie-Mason and Pindyck.72 The cartel was far
more efficient than believed, and it was able to overcome external factors
by adopting coherent market strategies. ME was one of the longest-
running and most successful cartels in the history of modern mining.73
The experience of the ME sales office in the first stages of the cartel
confirms that without an efficient network and minimum flexibility in
prices, it is impossible to generate any commercial policy. Nevertheless,
the outsourcing of sales proved to be a workable system, although only
when exercised by a single seller, as in the case of Roura & Forgas orMet-
allgesellschaft. In contrast, the system of representatives did not work,
due to insufficient incentives or inflexibility in negotiating prices amid
an economic crisis. Our research underlines that keeping prices artifi-
cially high and fixed is an error in this type of cartel, especially in the
case of a fall in demand, however small the market participation of out-
siders. In short, this policy can be justified only under extraordinary con-
ditions, such as occurred during World War II. The experience of ME
shows that traders and producer members did not share the same inter-
pretation of the concept of price flexibility.
Alternatives to a cartel, in the form of real competition among Euro-
pean producers or of continuing the system of delegating sales, would
not necessarily have generated an improvement in technological devel-
opment in the face of rigid demand. Indeed, earlier experiences, such
as that of the Rothschilds, had shown that intermediaries require
stable production to manipulate the market and that the intermediaries
end up taking the lion’s share of the extraordinary profits made from
holding all the production and increasing the prices.
In both countries there was a double governance structure in public
companies: technical and political. The former comprised the engineers
and state lawyers working for the IRI or the Almadén board, who re-
tained their positions regardless of political change. In general, they
were efficient managers but were at the mercy of the politicians when
it came to certain decisions. The politicians facilitated the cartel and
guaranteed its stability, although at times they meddled and imposed
changes in the agreements that did not make economic sense.
Interference by the Spanish and Italian governments hindered the
smooth running of the cartel. Instances included the defenestration of
72MacKie-Mason and Pindyck, “Cartel Theory and Cartel Experience,” 201.
73Harm Schröter, “Cartelization and Decartelization in Europe, 1870–1995: Rise and
Decline of an Economic Institution,” Journal of European Economic History 25, no. 1
(1996): 129–53; Harm Schröter, “Small European States and Cooperative Capitalism, 1920–
1960,” in Big Business and the Wealth of Nations, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Franco
Amatori, and Takashi Hikino (Cambridge, U.K., 1997), 176–204; Harm Schröter, “Cartels Re-
visited: An Overview on Fresh Questions, NewMethods, and Surprising Results,” Revue écon-
omique 64, no. 6 (2013): 989–1010.
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the cartel’s best sales agent, Roura & Forgas; the meddling in the sales
policies of the Spanish government in 1940; and the lack of coordination
in the 1949 sale to the U.S. government, which resulted in five years of
crisis for the cartel. The state’s active role in establishing and governing
a cartel is no guarantee of rational business conduct. Both the Spanish
and the Italian governments were more motivated by the defense of
their national interests than by market optimization. Far from being
used as a special foreign-policy tool by the Italian and Spanish govern-
ments, as ClemensWurm suggests,MEwas able to deal well with the del-
icate balance between governments and traders and the cartel members’
long-term interests.74 As the more pragmatic approach by Levenstein
and Suslow suggests, ME can be considered a perfect example of adapta-
tion to its complex and contradictory context.
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